Operation Chastise - Bomber Command’s Most Daring Feat
(L-R) Wing Commander Guy Gibson, Pilot Officer Spafford, Flight Lieutenant Hutchinson, Pilot Officer Deering and Flying Officer Taerum
On the night of the 16th of May 1943, nineteen Avro Lancaster’s took off from RAF Scampton in one of the war’s most daring operations. Their targets were deep inside the Ruhr Valley, an industrial heartland which was crucial to German war production and their ability to wage war. Their actions that night have been forever immortalised in the memory of the war and beyond, but how successful was the mission in reality?
Since the outbreak of war in 1939, Britain had suffered defeats both in Europe and the Far East. The disastrous fall of France in 1940 meant that Britain could no longer fight Germany on the ground in Europe, but rather Britain would strike through the fists of Bomber Command. Large scale raids such as Operation Gomorrah, targeting Hamburg in July of 1943 lasted over seven consecutive nights, destroying large swathes of the city, and killing forty thousand. Large scale raids on primarily civilian targets like Hamburg had now been adopted as the primary tactic of Bomber Command due to the conditions they were operating in, as poor results from bombing small, isolated targets was made even more difficult by bombing in the night. Studies from the time show bombs dropped by Bomber Command had only a one in five chance of landing within five miles of the target. This prompted a change in strategy for Bomber Command, most notably with the appointment of Arthur Harris in February of 1942. Harris adopted large scale ‘terror’ bombing of German cities. Harris believed that such large-scale destruction would be caused by Bomber Command, resulting in a collapse of morale and industries in the cities destroyed, thus facilitating a surrender. This strategy was to be combined with the efforts of the United States Air Force, who would strike targets in the day, and then Bomber Command would strike in the night.
As early as 1939, Justus Dillgardt, chairman of the Ruhr Dam Association, warned that bombs exploding within a hundred feet of the base of the dams would prompt a dam collapse. The resulting damage would affect the industrial base that relied on the hydroelectric power the dams produced, accounting for a quarter of Germany’s production in the Ruhr. Furthermore, Bomber Command had already discussed the idea of attacking the Mohne Dam in 1940 as its importance to the productivity of the Ruhr was crucial. This was impossible to carry out however, as the armament available to Bomber Command was not capable enough to dent the Mohne, yet alone destroy it. German defences were also a key obstacle, as torpedo nets helped protect from such an attack. Thus, with conventional bombs and torpedoes out of the equation, a new and rather unorthodox method had to be developed to strike the dams in the Ruhr.
Barnes Wallis, Assistant Chief Designer for the plane manufacturing company Vickers-Armstrong was soon to be propelled into the forefront of the planning for Chastise. Wallis was a skilled purveyor of his ideas, by exploiting personal relationships, he managed to turn companies into assisting him. Wallis was also a theorist in strategy, publishing papers like the March 1941 “A note on methods of attacking the Axis powers,'' which, in a prelude of what was to come, argued the case that dams and the water it harboured, if breached, could become war-winning. Therefore, in the spring of 1942, Wallis went about designing a weapon that could destroy the dams.
Due to the torpedo nets and the impracticality of dropping large amounts of conventional munitions on the dams in the Ruhr, Wallis found that a weapon that could skim across the water and eventually nestle beside the dam was the best solution. He had experimented with this idea, first at the Silvermere Lake to bounce small projectiles down test tanks, but then eventually moved to the more appropriate National Physical Laboratory at Teddington to test his theories. Not only was the Royal Air Force attracted to Wallis’s ideas, but the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm was as well. Crucially, some of the Navy’s most important men were alongside Wallis whilst at Teddington. Wallis demonstrated to Rear Admiral Edward De Faye Renouf, who was now the Admiralty Director of Special Weapons, that if a two inch sphere was released from the plane, the sphere would skim the water and roll down beneath the target ship's hull. The naval variant was codenamed ‘Highball’, whilst the weapon that would eventually be used was to be codenamed as ‘Upkeep’. As a result of these trials, Renouf encouraged the chairman of Vickers-Armstrong, Sir Charles Craven, to prioritise Wallis’s ideas.The enthusiasm for Wallis’s findings was also met with a degree of scepticism, most notably from the Ministry of Aircraft Production regarding the modifications that would have to be put in place for the plane to carry the weapon, as modifications would be expensive and constrain an already tight budget. Despite these challenges however, permission was eventually given for a Vickers Wellington Bomber to carry a prototype of Wallis’s bomb, and in July of 1943 an order for twelve examples were placed with Oxley Engineering Company. Further tests were carried out with these prototypes at Chesil Beach, producing mixed results.
More apprehension emerged in the places where Wallis pitched his ‘bouncing bomb’. Indeed, even Commander-in-Chief Arthur Harris noted that Wallis's invention had “not the smallest chance of it working.” Wallis met rejection with desperation; letters sent from Wallis to men like Fred Winterbotham, who was Head of the Air Section in the Secret Intelligence Service, contained Wallis’s pleas for his experiments and the potential for his idea to be recognised. At this time also, Winterbotham sent the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for intelligence a letter detailing that he was fearful of the Navy using his invention before it was properly thought out and implemented against the dams, thus spoiling the potential it carried. Captain Syd Bufton, following a meeting with Wallis and others, delivered a report that claimed any operation involving ‘Upkeep’ would “offer a very good chance of success” Despite this, Arthur Harris, Chief of Bomber Command, was still adamant that an attack on the dams would not wield the same result as his continued attack on cities. Despite Harris’s opposition, he still agreed to meet Wallis, and quipped to him “my boy’s lives are too precious to be wasted on your crazy notions”. It was rather ironic for Harris to make such a statement, as Bomber Command’s casualties over the Reich were increasingly mounting, with Harris’s ambition of grounding the war economy to dust not being realised.
By February of 1943, Harris had no choice but to accept that the raid was going ahead. Despite him being the chief, such optimism was shared by not only those in direct contact with Wallis but other significant figures like Lord Louis Mountbatten, which meant that he had little choice but to resign to the fact that the operation was going ahead. Wallis himself theorised about the targets of his invention, naming dams like the Mohne, Eder, Sorpe and others. The Mohne dam alone was the most attractive option due to its significant value to the area, and Wallis went as far to claim that a breach of this dam would be a “‘“disaster of the first magnitude.”’”
On the ground, Avro Lancasters were being modified to carry “‘“Upkeep”’”. The Avro Lancaster was a four engined, heavy bomber crewed by seven people. The Lancaster carried thirty three thousand pounds of fuel and munitions, whilst the plane itself weighed under thirty seven thousand pounds. The Lancaster was, in the eyes of Bomber Command at least, the most valuable plane designed in the war by Avro’s Chief Designer Roy Chadwick. Chadwick had initially designed the Avro Manchester in 1939 to fulfil the urgent need for more powerful aircraft, however problems with the Manchester was its distinct lack of power. With only two engines,the plane itself had issues with getting airborne with a payload sufficient enough for combat operations. Consequently, Chadwick went back to the drawing board and designed the Avro Lancaster. The Manchester and the Lancaster shared the same frame, but Chadwick solved the power problems by expanding the wingspan and adding four Merlin engines. This soon became a successful design, and by its first combat operation in April of 1942, the Avro Lancaster was soon leading Bomber Command’s charge across occupied Europe. Special Modifications for the Avro Lancaster had been undertaken for the attack on the dams, with the middle-upper turret removed, and its accommodating bomb-bay removed as well in order to fit the distinct shape of ‘Upkeep’. These Lancasters with the modifications were to be separately built at the Avro factory itself. As planning for the operation’s tactical aspects continued, the question arose in command of who should actually undertake the mission to breach the dams. Harris soon ordered that the force be drawn from No. 5 Group, a Bomber Command formation that was elite and up to the task ahead. Further specialisation for the mission was prepared also, as 5 Group itself would detach a formation to attack the dams. The man who would lead the group and go on the raid, codenamed Squadron X was to be Wing Commander, Guy Gibson.
Guy Gibson was one of Bomber Command’s most talented individuals. At just twenty four years old during Operation Chastise, Gibson commanded 106 Squadron of Bomber Command and had completed numerous raids over Europe. Gibson was arrogant, authoritative and frequently showed contempt for men who ranked below him. Gibson had been a child of the Empire, and had been looked after by servants of his parents whilst he was growing up in India, which could explain his arrogance. Gibson was disliked by his juniors to the extent they nicknamed him the ‘Boy Emperor’ and the ‘Arch-Bastard’ later on in his distinguished career. By 1940, Gibson had achieved his first award, the distinguished Flying Cross, and although he was disliked by most who knew him, his abilities were not ignored. Gibson was further honoured with a second Distinguished Flying Cross for his actions in the twin engined Beufighter. Gibson’s arrogant nature proved effective on operations, as his nature demanded the best out of his men, regardless of what they thought of him.
Gibson arrived at RAF Base Scampton on the 23rd of March 1943. By this point, Scampton was one of the prominent operational airfields that the Royal Air Force possessed. Gibson’s squadron coexisted with the operational 57 Squadron, also of Bomber Command. Gibson appointed a team of trusted officers that he could rely on to keep order and help organise such a task as Chastise. Gibson soon started personally ringing men he knew from his office in Scampton, such as pilot Joe McCarthy, who volunteered his crew for the mission. Other pilots like Les Munro and his crew were also to be chosen, alongside John Hopgood and David Shannon, among others. The people who were to fly the Lancaster’s in Chastise were not all British. Bomber Command had a vast amount of crew from around the Empire and the United States. Shannon, for example, was Australian, and Munro from New Zealand. However, what bound them together was a skill for flying and a daredevil attitude. Before the end of March 1943, 617 Squadron was now formed. Before training, Gibson declared that there was to be no leave for any of the crews due to security, and remarked “All I can tell you is that you will have to practise low flying all day and all night until you know how to do it with your eyes shut.”
By April of 1943, 617 Squadron had over 500 aircrew and ground personnel, alongside 58 officers and 481 Non Commissioned Officers. Training for the crews was being held in Wales, Gibson included, where low level runs on lakes and reservoirs to prepare the crews for the dams in the Ruhr. In these ‘attacks’, Lancasters would fly in groups of three in preparation for the real thing. Due to the nature of the attack, with the run being straight on rather than overhead, conventional bomb sights were not practical. Therefore, a wooden triangle was made to align with the two towers of the Mohne dam. On this device, the aiming sight was to be placed in the middle of the two sides, and thus when the markers on the side of the device aligned, ‘Upkeep’ would be dropped. This was not entirely a successful invention due to the impractical nature of one hand holding the device and the other hand holding the toggle, it helped at least to give an estimation. Further, the height of the aircraft was pivotal. In order for ‘Upkeep’ to be dropped, survive the fall, and then skim over the torpedo nets, the weapon had to be released at an altitude of sixty feet. Thus, lamps were fitted to help the crew know when they were at the right altitude. This was not a relatively new idea, but one that was used by the RAF coastguard when attacking submarines. Further trials with ‘Upkeep’ were held in Kent, and it was here that Wallis requested that it be dropped at a height of 60 feet, and at 210 miles per hour with the bomb being released at an estimated 410 yards.Further rehearsals of the attack were held at Eyebrook and Abberton, this time being with VHF radio communication. This device was installed on the Lancasters in training, and its purpose was that Gibson could play the role of a master bomber, by directing and issuing instructions to the rest of the crews whilst on attack runs. This was not installed in the main force of Lancasters until later in the war, therefore this was still new equipment and would be crucial in the coming raid. Further Intelligence gathered by the Royal Air Force highlighted the weaponry on the Mohne dam. Its two towers contained 20mm guns, which was deadly in defending from low attack runs. Additional 20mm guns were placed around the dam as well, in order to provide an effective killing zone from the sides of the water. The other two main targets, the Eder and the Sorpe, had markedly less armament defending it.
Increased intelligence and training commenced. At this time, training had been so intense that leave was granted, albeit for two days. Gibson was made aware of the attack;s plans at this time also. First, nine aircraft would take off to destroy the Mohne, and after the Mohne was breached, the remaining Lancaster’s from the attack at the Mohne would head to the Eder dam. Another five would attack the Sorpe, with six Lancasters being held in reserve. The entire operation was to be held at low level in order to avoid enemy radar sending fighters to intercept, and this was something Gibson frequently drilled into his men and what the training had been about. At certain times in the flight, Gibson would raise his plane up to five hundred feet in order to give the navigator information on landmarks, apart from that however, it was to be below five hundred feet. The five Lancasters attacking the Sorpe would depart Scampton first, and cross into Europe at different points to help with scheduling, as if the aircraft was circling at night around a restricted area, as it would risk the chance of collision. Gibson also made alternative arrangements with two other pilots, John Hopgood and Melvin Young. Gibson instructed that it would be them who would command if he went down. On the 13th of May, a live upkeep was dropped off of Broadstairs at seventy five feet, going five hundred rpm. It bounced seven times and travelled eight hundred yards, which gave further reassurance to Gibson that ‘Upkeep’ would work. In order for the Bouncing Bomb to work and skim across, it had to be spun before the attack run, and this responsibility was given to the wireless operator.
On the 15th of May, final preparations for Chastise were underway, readying the planes for the following night. Orders had been issued to 617 Squadron to carry out the raid. Briefings for pilots and navigators were led by Gibson, and it was here that they were informed of the targets, being the Mohne, Eder, and Sorpe. Further instructions were given to the rest of the crews, with Barnes Wallis in attendance. There was considerable relief among the crews, as they had initially expected to attack the U Boat pens, or Kriegsmarine battleships like the Tirpitz. Crews were also warned of the defences on offer at the dams, which meant that the front turret would play a pivotal role in defending the attacking planes. To exaggerate the strengths of these Lancasters, it was decided that instead of the one in four rounds being a tracer, all rounds would be tracer. This was a dangerous gamble, as while it did give the impression there was more firepower than there actually was, constant tracer rounds meant that the plane’s position was constantly visible for the defending anti aircraft guns.
Guy Gibson and his crew enter AJ-G ‘George’ on the 16th of May 1943
Just before 9.30pm, the first Lancaster, AJ-E- ‘Easy’, piloted by Robert Barlow took off from Scampton. At one minute intervals the rest of the detachment for the Sorpe dam departed. Gibson, Martin and Hopgood departed at 10:39. By midnight, all nineteen Lancaster’s were airborne, despite some being behind schedule. Gibson, piloting AJ-G ‘George’ crossed a section over the heavily defended Dutch coast due to a navigational error, and the front gun fired rounds at the defences below. Further north from Gibson, the first losses of Chastise occurred. AJ-K-’King’, piloted by Vernon Byers, was hit by anti aircraft fire. AJ-K- ‘King’ bursted into flames and then plunged into the sea at 11pm, with the loss of all the crew. Les Munro, pilot of AJ-W ‘Willie’ was also hit by anti aircraft fire and forced to return to Scampton alongside AJ-H ‘Harry’, which had flown too low across the water and consequently lost the mine.
On the way to their target, AJ-E ‘Easy’ piloted by Barlow, who was first to take off, collided with power lines in Holland. The plane burst into a ball of flames on the ground and all crew was lost just before midnight. This therefore left only one Lancaster, AJ-T ‘Tommy’ to target the Sorpe dam. By this time, Gibson, Maltby, Shannon and Young had crossed the border into Germany from the low countries and had now made it to the Rhine, and was met with fierce anti aircraft fire that had damaged AJ-M ‘Mother’, piloted by Hopgood. AJ-B ‘Baker’, piloted by Bill Astel, was less fortunate, and had collided with power lines in a similar fashion to ‘Easy’ and had also lost the entirety of his crew. A recurring theme of the losses so far on the way to the target was that the extreme low level altitude, combined with the darkness and lack of navigational assistance from Gee, meant that collisions with power lines were often unavoidable as they were noticed within the last few seconds.
Past midnight, Gibson first caught a glimpse of the Mohne Dam. Alongside Gibson at the dam were five other Lancasters, each being targeted with the anti aircraft batteries at the target. Gibson was first to make his attack run, whilst the others circled. ‘Upkeep’ was successfully dropped within 45 seconds of the attack run, and its explosion soared water above the dam, briefly stopping the spitting from the Anti Aircraft fire. Despite the damage, the dam still stood. Therefore, Gibson called in AJ-M ‘Mother’, piloted by Hopgood, for their approach on the dam.
The second time round, Anti Aircraft fire had started the second Hopgood turned to do his run. Fire from the german defences had set ‘Mother’ alight, and Hopgood was forced to drop his bomb way before it was ready due to the flames, and consequently it bounced over the dam and landed in the hydroelectric power station below. ‘Mother’ would then explode, with only three of the crew managing to escape the blaze. Despite the loss of Hopgood, Gibson could not call off the attack, and thus it was now the turn of AJ-P ‘Popsie’ piloted by Harold Martin. Gibson was to also fly alongside Martin in an effort to draw fire away. AJ-P ‘Popsie’ successfully dropped its bomb, but short of fifty yards of the dam and thus the explosion did not do much to breach it. After three attempts, it was still standing. For the fourth time, another Lancaster had its turn to destroy the Mohne, and this time it did. Maltby’s AJ-J ‘Johnny’, with wireless operator Anthony Stone preparing the ultimately successful ‘Upkeep’. At last, the Mohne was breached.
Following the breach of the Mohne, the torrent was almost biblical in its nature. Gibson had sent Martin and Maltby back to Scampton, whilst he was to stay with the remaining Lancasters on their way to attack the Eder dam. Although the Eder was stripped of its anti-aircraft batteries, it was protected by geography. On the approach to the Eder, hills rise hundreds of feet alongside a forest, so there was very little time for the bomb aimer to accurately drop the bomb. Eventually, three ‘Upkeeps’ were able to be dropped from AJ-L ‘Leather’ piloted by Shannon, AJ-Z ‘Zebra’ of Maudslay, and Knight’s AJ-J ‘Nancy’, which was the plane to cause the breach. AJ-Z ‘Zebra’ had been caught up with the explosion from their ‘Upkeep’ that had bounced over, and thus did not return to Scampton. It is assumed that they later crashed on their way back to Scampton. By two in the morning, both the Mohne and the Eder dam were breached. The Sorpe Dam was deemed to be unbreachable, however the primary objective was the Mohne and Eder.
The reserve wave of Lancasters that were to be directed at the dams if the initial attacks had failed met furious anti-aircraft fire from German defences. AJ-C ‘Charlie’, part of the reserve wave, was hit and crashed. Right before impact, pilot Warner Ottley radioed over the intercom to his crew “‘“I'm sorry boys, we’ve had it.”’” The altitude that Ottley was flying at meant that the plane was too low to bail out, but too high to survive a crash landing due to the fires. AJ-S ‘Sugar’, piloted by Lewis Burpee, also part of the reserve wave, had crashed into a tree due to a searchlight directly beaming into the cockpit, blinding him. The deaths of Ottley and Burpee can be at least partly attributed to the planners of Chastise. They were sent up too late, and with German defences aware of their targets, it was little more than a death trap for Lancasters crossing the border into the Reich.
At Scampton, the crews started to return. Martin, Maltby and McCarthy landed before 3.30am, and others returned in the hours following. Arthur Harris had gone out to meet one of the returning Lancaster AJ-O ‘Orange’, piloted by Bill Townsend. Upon disembarking from his Lancaster, Townsend was asked how the raid had gone by Harris. Amusingly, Townsend, unfamiliar with Harris, had rebuked him and told him to wait until the debriefing had finished. Eight Lancasters out of the nineteen had failed to return.
Commander in Chief Arthur Harris, along with Chief Intelligence Officer Ralph Cocrane attend a debrief with a returning crew
In conclusion, Chastise was a success. It had achieved its objectives in breaching the Mohne and Eder dams. Water had rushed across the plains below, drowning livestock and people, mainly slave-labourers from occupied countries like Ukraine and Poland. Three hydroelectric plants were destroyed, and railway’s that were crucial in transporting material to repair the damage were destroyed or temporarily unusable. Civilians, initially thinking the attack was to be carried out with bombs, hid in cellars which meant that the water drowned them. Those who survived the flood were now homeless, and in the following weeks, bodies were found with no clothes due to the violent nature of the flood. The bodies of the slave labourers who had died were marked unceremoniously, with remarks like ‘Unknown Russian’. Six thousand cattle, six hundred and twenty-five pigs had drowned, along with four thousand hectares of farmland that was now unusable. Perhaps the most striking effect Chastise caused was its effects on civilian morale, both in Britain and Germany. News of the raid was paraded on newspapers in Britain, one such example being ‘HUNS GET A FLOOD BLITZ’ in the Mirror, and other outlets reporting wide damage. In Germany, the scale of the damage was hard to hide and rumours spread quickly. German sources reported that as little as seven hundred had died, when in reality the number was somewhere in the thousands, impossible to calculate however due to the nature of the flood and the majority of the casualties being slave labourers. Further, Chastise helped compound an already worsening economic and military situation inside the Reich. By 1943, Germany had lost its chance to take the oil it so desperately needed in the Caucasus, and in the process lost an entire army group. Although the dams did not entirely halt the Ruhr’s economic activity, it did help divert precious resources away from factories and instead into repairing the dams, which it did in 1944. Gibson was awarded the Victoria Cross by the king following a visit to Scampton, and Gibson was paraded around Canada and America for morale, even holding personal meetings with American President Roosevelt. Gibson would die on operations on the 19th of September 1944, due to friendly fire from a Lancaster that had mistaken it for a German night fighter. David Maltby and his crew, including Anthony Stone, would also perish in the course of the war, crashing into the North Sea in September of 1943.
Bibliography:
Hastings, Max. Chastise. London: William Collins 2019
National Geographic. The bombing of Hamburg foreshadowed the horrors of Hiroshima. Accessed 1st July 2024. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/the-bombing-of-hamburg-foreshadowed-the-horrors-of-hiroshima#:~:text=EXPLAINER-,The%20bombing%20of%20Hamburg%20foreshadowed%20the%20horrors%20of%20Hiroshima,German%20radar%20all%20but%20useless.
Imperial War Museum. The Avro Lancaster Bomber and the Dambusters Raid. Accessed 1st July 2024. https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-avro-lancaster-bomber-and-the-dambusters-raid
Dam Busters. The Story of the Dambusters. Accessed 1st July 2024 https://www.rafbf.org/dambusters/the-story-of-the-dambusters#:~:text=The%20raid%2C%20on%20the%20night,19%20specially%20adapted%20Lancaster%20bombers.
National Army Museum. The struggle for North Africa, 1940-43. Accessed 1st July 2024 https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/struggle-north-africa-1940-43
Imperial War Museum. RAF Bomber Command during the Second World War. Accessed 1st July 2024. https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/raf-bomber-command-during-the-second-world-war
Forces War Records. Operation Chastise - Dambusters WW2 80th Anniversary. Accessed 1st July 2024. https://blog.forceswarrecords.com/operation-chastise-dambusters-ww2-80th-anniversary/
History Extra. How Successful was the Dambusters raid? Accessed 1st July 2024. https://www.historyextra.com/period/second-world-war/dambusters-raid-success-effective-second-world-war/
The London Mint Office. Unsung Heros: Guy Gibson and the Dambusters. Accessed 1st July 2024. https://www.londonmintoffice.org/blog/27-military/lest-we-forget/253-unsung-heroes-guy-gibson-the-dambusters-raid
Dambusters Blog. Dambuster of the day No.32: Anthony Stone. Accessed 1st July 2024 https://dambustersblog.com/2013/05/14/dambuster-of-the-day-no-32-antony-stone/
Images:
Imperial War Museums. IWM (TR 1127). Accessed 1st July 2024 https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205123900
Imperial War Museums. IWM (CH 18005) Accessed 1st July 2024 https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205195109
Imperial War Museums. IWM (CH 9683) Accessed 1st July 2024 https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205195111