Waterloo Revisited- How was Napoleon Defeated?
Nearly two hundred years have passed since the Napoleonic Wars came to an epic conclusion near the village of Waterloo on Sunday the 18th of June, 1815. However, the sound of the cannons have forever been immortalised in the memory of the British Army and scholarship surrounding the battle has been ever increasing. What actually happened on that fateful Sunday? And how did the once great conqueror of Europe come to be defeated by an army led by Wellington, who remarked that his forces were “very weak, ill equipped”? And, how did the Grand Armee which had once struck fear into France’s enemies become routed?
On the 15th of June, Napoleon crossed the border into Belgium following his return to France from his exile at Elba. Napoleon’s main force, the Armee Du Nord, which crossed with him, numbered one hundred and twenty-four thousand men with artillery and cavalry.. However, this was not as many as Napoleon would have liked, as Paris had to be guarded with under twenty thousand by the Marshal of the Empire, Nicholas Davout. Furthermore, eighty-five thousand were dedicated to defending the frontiers of France, against the Russian’s marching west with two hundred thousand men, and two hundred and ten thousand for the Austrians. Most significantly, the two armies in Belgium contained Marshal Blucher of the Prussian army, who commanded one hundred and sixteen thousand, and Wellington one hundred and twelve thousand. Wellington had particular cause to be concerned. The army was a ‘patchwork’ of British and Hanoverian forces, also including soldiers from a variety of German states. To complicate matters further, Wellington did not have all his crack units from his time in the Peninsula, due to them being in service in America. However, units like the King's German Legion and the 1st Foot Guards, two units that had distinguished themselves in service, were still with Wellington, despite the other shortcomings in experience with his army.
Napoleon was used to being outnumbered, but the most pressing issue was time. Napoleon had planned the campaign to be relatively short. In preparation for this, twelve thousand uniforms per day were being created alongside thirteen thousand muskets between May and June. This was all in an effort to give Napoleon the tools to deliver a knockout blow to both the Prussians and the British, as he was hoping that the catastrophic defeat that the French would inflict on them would deter Austria and Russia from advancing further and instead sue for peace. Napoleon's plan was to divide each of the Prussian and British armies and deal with them individually, and not to let them combine their forces, as if they did they would vastly outnumber him.
On the 16th of June, Napoleon got what he wished for. Marshal of the Empire, Michel Ney, nicknamed the ‘bravest of the brave’ for his daring rearguard actions, first shown when retreating in Portugal, and then in the disastrous campaign in Russia in 1812 was tasked with marching west with a portion of the Armee Du Nord. Numbering twenty-four thousand, his task was to capture the crossroads of Quatre Bras. Quatre Bras was significant as it stood on 4 major roads, being the Charleroi-Brussels route, and Nivells-Namur route. The British deployment at Quatre Bras was rather staggered, with reinforcements from Wellington arriving there after a thirty-mile march. Ney’s order was written with a dramatic, utmost urgency- “the fate of France is in your hands. Thus do not hesitate even for a moment to carry the manoeuvre". However, Ney hesitated. One can see the hesitation of Ney as completely unexplainable as British forces were still organising and the road lightly defended, Ney’s experience in the Peninsula war had clouded his judgement. Ney was one of many of Napoleon’s marshalate who had left Spain with a worse reputation than when the marshals had arrived, and Ney had learned the hard way that attacking disciplined British infantry head on caused a high level of casualties. Consequently, Ney was concerned that Wellington had hidden troops. This was not an entirely unfounded claim- Wellington had mastered the use of geography in his concealment of forces in the Peninsula. When Ney had finally committed, rather half-heartedly, further confusion arose when Napoleon ordered the 1st Corps, under General D'Erlon, to march away from reinforcing Ney at Quatre Bras and instead turn backwards towards the battlefield of Ligny. Upon hearing this, Ney then counter-ordered D’Erlon to return to his position at once, meaning D’Erlon was not able to influence either of the day’s battles.
Whilst Ney was dithering at Quatre Bras, a fierce fight had developed only seven miles away from him, near the valley of Ligny, where Marshal Blucher and his force were engaged in fierce fighting with the bulk of Napoleon’s army. Napoleon was faring significantly better than Ney. Napoleon gave the order for the Imperial Guard to advance, which caused the Prussians to break. Sixteen-thousand Prussians were killed or wounded, and significantly eight-thousand Rhinelanders had deserted the colours and fled. Critically, Blucher had been injured in the fighting at Ligny, and lay unconscious beneath his horse, which meant that General Gneisenau was now in charge of nursing the battered Prussian armies' retreat. Gneisenau now had the option of either marching eastwards back to Prussia, or heading north to Wavre in order to maintain a line of contact with Wellington, something which Gneisenau’s superior and Wellington both constantly reiterated in the planning stages of their campaign. Consequently, Gnesenau gave the order to march north, and so set in motion the following day’s events.
Despite both Ney and Napoleon achieving their objective of driving the British out of Quatre Bras and making the Prussians retreat, Napoleon missed his chance of pressing his advantage. Napoleon’s earlier campaign was characterised with speed and aggression, with bold manoeuvres like at Austerlitz in 1805. Despite the bold manoeuvres Napoleon was capable of previously, they were not to be repeated in a context which demanded the same aggression. The following morning of both engagements, Napoleon spent the day surveying his victory at Ligny and then making one of the most significant actions of the whole campaign, dispatching Emmanual Grouchy with thirty-thousand men to engage the Prussians and keep them away from the fight that Napoleon was certain would occur with Wellington. Marshal Blucher, despite his wounds that he had taken in the fighting at Ligny, he rejoined the main body of his force who welcomed him with cheers. The appearance of ‘Marshal Vorwards’ had reinvigorated the men, who had been marching throughout the night in torrential weather. Relating back to the dispatch of Grouchy, issues arose. Most pressing was that Napoleon dispatched Grouchy late in the day. This was compounded when the extreme weather and general slow pace of Grouchy’s force meant that it took seven hours to march only six miles, meaning the Prussians were able to move without any significant engagement from Grouchy. Similarly, Wellington managed to retreat, relatively unharmed despite a minor engagement of his rearguard, back to Mont St Jean.
When visiting Mont St Jean today, one can note the strategic significance. Situated just twelve miles south of Brussels and near two vital roads, it was of utmost importance to both Wellington and Napoleon. The geography stood out to Wellington as defendable and solid. Most striking was the appearance of the reverse slopes, which provided cover from Napoleon's most feared asset- his artillery. The use of reverse slopes, hills and other forms of natural cover was not a new invention in warfare; however it was still extremely effective. The Duke had mastered the use of minimising losses to his own forces by natural cover, and concealing forces that could turn the tide of the battle in the decisive moment. The position also contained three well defendable positions, notably Chateau de Hougoumont on Wellington's right, the farmhouse of La Haye Sainte in the middle and the often less mentioned, but still critically important, Papelotte. These three positions were tactically crucial, as they provided anchors for Wellington to hold on to and offer the chance to engage with forward-advancing French skirmishers, and other types of infantry and cavalry.
Upon receiving the news that Wellington had committed to his position, Napoleon reportedly exclaimed: “Ah! Now I've got them, those English!”. Napoleon’s hubris had also been reflected in his breakfast conversations with those surrounding him at Le Caillou, with Napoleon promising the day's affair would be a picnic. Napoleon’s generals, less confident than he, claimed that he was now facing a force that had “never given way” in the Peninsula. Napoleon snapped back that “because you have been beaten by Wellington, you think he's a good general. But I tell you that Wellington is a bad general and the English are bad troops”. One can debate whether these words were actually said by Napoleon, but what was certain was that he totally believed that his Imperial Eagles would once again march victorious into Brussels, just like they had done so menacingly in other capitals of Europe in the past. The weather the previous night had been intense, with strong rain storms meaning the ground had become a mix of mud and grass, despite the rain stopping at nine o’clock in the morning. The weather thus hindered Napoleon’s staging, as General Drouot of the Imperial Guard warned Napoleon that in the ground's current state, his artillery guns could not be brought up to the field. After all, Napoleon’s twelve-pound cannons needed a large crew to haul each piece up in normal conditions, let alone in the mud. Thus, Napoleon waited for the ground to dry, and in the process spending his most valuable currency, time.
The actual time the battle started is disputed, but it is generally agreed upon that the day's actions started with an attack upon Hougoumont at 11.30am, on Wellington's right. As mentioned previously,Hougoumont was a key anchor in Wellington's position, as it provided cover to his right and centre. Furthermore, it was an effective drain for French reserves, as Jerome Bonaparte, Napoleon’s brother, would send more and more of his men throughout the day to capture it. This was not entirely a bad idea, but mostly unsupported by artillery, Hougoumont managed to stay in the hands of Wellington through the course of the day despite a brief entry, which was then exiled by a valiant defence of the Coldstream Guards.
At 1:30pm, Napoleon launched his grand infantry attack that he hoped would break the line, just as his attack at Ligny had done. Napoleon ordered D'Erlon’s corps, who could have made either Ligny or Quatre Bras decisive victories, forward with sixteen-thousand men supported by artillery and cavalry on his flanks. D'Erlon’s advance was hindered by mud and tall corn, which considerably drained their energy. The “rush and enthusiasm” of the men was becoming ““disastrous”” according to the account of Captain Duthilt, who had advanced forward with them. There are two possible explanations for why the men were so enthusiastic, with one being that because they had not fought at either Quatre Bras or Ligny, so they wanted their chance to fight at Waterloo. Secondly, before the battle, whilst Napoleon was waiting for the mud to dry, he made an appearance in front of his men, to which he was received with cheers of ‘Vive Le Emperor!’. This would of course energise the men before such a crucial engagement. Before the attack had reached Wellington’s position properly, General Durutte captured Papelotte, which anchored Wellington's extreme left. Further success, albeit limited, came when the garden and orchard of La Haye Saint was captured, which would have posed a significant threat to Wellington had their advancement in La Haye Sainte been more successful. The main column managed to roll up the left centre of the hill reaching the crest, and crucially even reaching beyond in some parts. A Dutch brigade which was under strength and faced accurate cannon fire soon broke as D'Erlon’s men broke through parts of Wellington’s line. Picton’s 5th division however managed to contain the breach through murderous volleys and vicious hand to hand fighting, and crucially bided time for the famous charge of the Union Brigade under Ponsonby.
The initial charge of the Union Brigade had sent D’Erlon’s attack reeling from the ridge and sent them back into the valley. The sheer punch that the Union Brigade and other units had delivered meant that there wasn’t a chance for the majority of D’Erlon’s men to organise into squares, which could of provided cover against the cavalry. Despite this success, Wellington’s cavalry over extended due to the initial success, and were soon cut off and largely destroyed by French cuirassiers and lancers. Worse, the mud considerably exhausted the horses, and by the time the French cavalry counter attacked, there was little that could be done to escape the trap. The aftermath of the charge was not all bad however- the farmhouse of Pappelotte had been recaptured, and Wellington used this time to reinforce his line with the 10th Brigade, taking the place of the Dutch brigade that had fled when D’Erlon’s men had overrun them. On the Gembloux-Wavre road, Grouchy and his thirty-thousand man detachment were still making their way to Wavre to engage the Prussians. Napoleon’s cannons were easily overheard by Grouchy, but the unimaginative, strict Marshal overruled pleas by General Gerard to ‘march to the sound of the guns’. Not all the blame could go to Grouchy, as Napoleon had trusted Grouchy to follow his orders and engage the Prussians at Wavre, despite Napoleon seeing the forward guard of Blücher linking with Wellington, albeit in limited numbers.
The success of the French cavalry in counterattacking the Union Brigade had meant that confidence was high despite the decimation of much of D’Erlon’s corps. Whilst Wellington was using this time to reorganise, Ney spotted men helping the wounded leave and be treated at the farmhouse of Mont Saint Jean. Further, he glanced at men retreating due to artillery, and thus he thought that Wellington was ordering a withdrawal. Wellington, seeing the large line of Curasier and Lancers numbering four thousand five hundred, ordered his forces to withdraw into square formation out of sight in anticipation of a bold manoeuvre by Ney. This further encouraged the attack, as the sight of other units withdrew back. When French cavalry had reached Wellington’s position, instead of looking at an army in retreat, they instead found groups of men shaped in squares that were ready to receive them. Squares were used as they protected infantry from horses due to their bayonets, as horses would not charge large protruding steel facing them. Squares were rarely broken by cavalry, except one incident in the Peninsula when a charge by the King's German Legion managed to destroy a French infantry square due to a horse collapsing on the side of the formation, which led to other cavalrymen being able to sword the men in their backs. At Waterloo however, Wellington’s squares lay largely disciplined and managed to resist numerous attempts, most commonly cited is seven. Increasingly frustrated by the failed attacks of the cavalry, Ney reportedly slashed his sabre into a nearby cannon piece, possibly giving credence to the view shared by modern day analysis, particularly that of Andrew Roberts, that Ney was suffering from combat fatigue from his time in Russia. This could have hindered his decision making, and also explains his later outburst at the end of the battle, in which he exclaimed “Come and see how a Marshal of France dies!”.
With time running out for Napoleon as the Prussians were increasingly arriving at Wellington's left, a fierce battle started at the nearby village of Plancenoit which further drained Napoleon’s reserves . The Prussians under Von Bülow, which consisted of thirty-thousand men, initially captured Plancenoit. In response, Napoleon released a counter attack of eight battalions of the Young Guard who fiercely contested the village, with house to house close combat until two Old Guard battalions captured and held the village. At Wavre, Grouchy was engaged in a battle with the Prussian rearguard, but he had failed his main objective in keeping Blücher away from Wellington.
By this time in the battle, despite Wellington receiving the reinforcements of Blücher, admittedly in a drip-feed style, a critical phase had developed. Hougoumont was still being contested, and La Haye Sainte had been captured by Ney at six o’clock in the evening, meaning Wellington had no anchor in the centre of his defence. This was the time for the rest of Napoleon’s Imperial Guard to advance and capitalise on Ney’s achievement of capturing the farmhouse, however Napoleon repeatedly refused to release the reserves, in part due to the struggle on his right and other engagements which had meant that fourteen-thousand of his reserve was already in action. He was later forced too, as the Prussian’s started to arrive in force at Smohain, on Wellington’s left, which could in turn let Wellington strengthen his centre before Napoleon had the chance to breach it. Napoleon gambled that if he launched the guard now, then he would be able to rout Wellington’s forces before the Prussians started to overrun his right flank, which was slowly starting to unravel despite Plancenoit holding on.
The actual number of the guard who advanced that evening is unknown, with estimates ranging from three thousand to five thousand. As the guard was preparing to advance, senior Generals rode across the face of the line exclaiming to the guard that Grouchy had arrived and would soon join them the moment they had broken the line. This of course was not true, but Napoleon needed to install hope into his last gamble. In a report given by Ney, he writes that the news given to the troops of Grouchy’s arrival “gave new proof of them at that moment in spite of the fatigue in which they experienced ''. Advancing with his guard, with his elite troops, Napoleon rode to within six hundred yards of Wellington’s position before handing over tactical control to Ney, giving rise to theories that Napoleon wanted to die in battle, and he had sent the guard to die with Napoleon at its head.
This cannot be possible however, due to the fact that the battle was still hanging in the balance, despite the arrival of large scale Prussian reinforcements. The Imperial Guard was not something which was deployed lightly, and although it had considerably less strength than its pre-1812 formations, it still held a fearsome reputation. Five battalions marched to the slopes in order to snatch victory for the emperor, and three battalions were held in reserve, and a handful of others were sent to other places like Plancenoit and Le Caillou, where Napoleon first received news of Wellington’s position in the morning. Remnants of D’Erlon’s corps also joined in the grand finale, and cavalry offered a degree of protection to the flanks. Ney, keeping with his reputation of the bravest of the brave, led the attack on foot after having his fifth horse of the day shot from beneath him. As the guard marched up the ridge, cannons loaded with grapeshot (a collection of balls that are designed to shatter and cause mass casualties in one blow) wreaked havoc on the guards advance. Whilst the guard was advancing, Wellington used his forces from his left flank to bolster the centre, in which he predicted would be the area where the wave of french troops would land on.
The attack soon overwhelmed the initial defence, with two allied brigades and artillery being overrun by the guard. A desperate counterattack led by David De Chasse, commander of a three-thousand-man Dutch-Belgian infantry unit soon engaged in hand-to-hand combat with an element of the guard and sent them fleeing down the slope. Next, the Chasseurs made their way up to the ridge, and again met the same disciplined fire from the anglo-allied army. Most famously was the sudden appearance of the 1st Foot Guards led by Maitland, who rose up from the cornfields and responded to the Chasseurs advance with accurate fire. Sensing the momentum had changed, Wellington ordered a general advance, and thus the entire British line surged forward and engaged in fierce fighting on the ridge. Just half an hour after the Guard had started advancing, the cry of ‘La guarde recule!’ (the guard recoils) meant that the attack had failed and organised French resistance had ceased. Three remaining guard units that had been held in reserve formed square at La Haye Sainte, and the famous remark of General Cambronne, ‘Merde!’ in response to the allied demand to surrender. Wherever Cambronne actually said this is still up for contention, however as the French army fled from the field with the Prussian cavalry in retreat, the day was Wellington’s and Napoleon was decisively defeated.
In conclusion, Napoleon lost the Waterloo campaign due to uncharacteristic behaviours, a staunch defence by Wellington, and pressure applied by the Prussians. One can meticulously study the events of the battle, such as the struggle for Hougemount or Ney’s charge, but the fact remains that Wellington held firm. The most striking reason for Napoleon’s defeat was that Wellington had entrenched himself in a position that favoured the defender much more than the attacker, and so when Napoleon “came on in the same old way”, he was beaten back in (a) similar fashion. Further reasons for his defeat was his inability to deliver a decisive blow at Ligny or Quatre Bras, either of which would have proved decisive. Further mistakes were made when he refused to release Grouchy until later the next day, meaning the Prussians had valuable time to march away. One might argue that the campaign was doomed to fail in the first place, as he was incredibly outnumbered in comparison to the coalition and, if he did manage to win at Waterloo- he would have faced a similar fate to which he had at Leipzig in 1813. Other reasons can be attributed to battlefield management of Ney in particular, with the example of the charge, but with anything that happened in the battle it is crucial to note the context surrounding the decision to charge. Further blame might be levied upon Grouchy, for not marching to the sound of the guns, but (until) that point his orders were to engage the Prussians at Wavre and not to let them link up, which he failed. However, one thing that is for certain is that the events on that Sunday on the 18th June 1815, effectively shaped Europe for a century right up to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.
By Raegan Kingett
Bibliography:
Henniker, M.C.A.‘“The Battle of Waterloo.” The Military Engineer 43 (295) (1951): 339–43. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44561359.
Napoleon Series. “The Battle of Waterloo By Alfons Libert’. Accessed 3rd June 2024. https://www.napoleon-series.org/military-info/battles/hundred/c_chapter5.html#:~:text=The%20Ground
Kirkpatrick, David. “The Battle of Waterloo.”’ Fighting in the Fog of War: Decision-Making under Extreme Uncertainty in the Waterloo Campaign. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (2015): 61-72 http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep37319.10.
Waterloo Association. French Cavalry Assault. Accessed 3rd June 2024. https://www.waterlooassociation.org.uk/2018/06/05/french-calvary-assault/
Waterloo Association. Struggle for La Haye Sainte. Accessed 3rd June 2024. https://www.waterlooassociation.org.uk/2018/06/03/struggle-for-la-haye-sainte/
Roberts, Andrew. Waterloo: Napoleon’s Last Gamble. London, HarperCollins 2010
Cornwell, Bernard. Waterloo : The History of Four Days, Three Armies and Three Battles. New York: Harper, 2016
British Battles. Battle of Quatre Bras. Accessed 3rd June 2024. https://www.britishbattles.com/napoleonic-wars/battle-of-quatre-bras/.
Warfare History Network. Marshall Ney and his biggest mistake at the Battle of Waterloo. Accessed June 4th 2024, https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/marshal-ney-and-his-biggest-mistake-at-the-battle-of-waterloo/#:~:text=When%20Marshal%20Ney%20mistook%20the,cavalry%20charges%20were%20soon%20dashed.